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            ABSTRACT 
 
What is at the heart of conflict over abortion? In his celebrated 
contribution to the topic, Ronald Dworkin argued that disputants in the 
abortion debate are in fact deeply mistaken about the true terms of their 
disagreement. Rather than turning on the perennial question of whether 
or not the fetus is a person, Dworkin claimed that abortion argument is, 
at bottom, an argument about the intrinsic value of all human life and 
how it is best respected. More than twenty years after Dworkin put 
forward his novel thesis, this article reassesses his key claims about the 
nub of abortion argument, partly in light of subsequent developments in 
the public abortion conflict. Against Dworkin’s revisionist account of the 
abortion problem, I set out to show that his arguments did not 
successfully displace the primacy of the personhood question in moral 
and legal constitutional reasoning about abortion. Nor do they 
convincingly establish that prenatal personhood is not what contestants 
in the abortion debate are really arguing about. 
 
 
 
I. PERSONHOOD IN ABORTION ARGUMENT 
 
When we argue about abortion, what should we argue about? In a topic so rife with 
moral complexity, it can be difficult to gain clarity on just where one’s starting point 
ought to be. Nevertheless, precisely where the locus of debate should reside is not 
just an interesting inquiry in its own right, but an essential first piece of the puzzle 
when it comes to thinking through the rights and wrongs of abortion. For many 
discussants, the argumentative priority of determining whether or not a fetus is 
what we understand to be a ‘person’ with strong moral rights is self-evident. 
Conversely, some serious and influential contributions to the abortion debate have 
sought to establish that the status of the fetus is neither morally nor legally decisive 
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for abortion, and is even rendered redundant by other philosophical considerations, 
some of which have clear legal analogues.  
 
 Speaking plainly, there is more than one way of telling someone that she is 
asking the wrong question about a contentious subject matter. On the one hand, one 
could say that her question misfires because the answer to that question will not, in 
the end, determine anything critical in the discussion, and then go on to illustrate 
why this is so. On the other hand, one might claim that there is something 
inherently defective about the question itself – that it asks something that cannot be 
answered; that it is irrational or unintelligible; that it is not pertinent to the topic 
under consideration, or that it is not what disputants are truly arguing about. 
Challenges of both kinds are represented by arguments in abortion debate which 
seek, in one way or another, to side-line or bypass the personhood question. But 
challenges of the first kind are, I think, more ubiquitous.  
 
Take the following claim, which we can call the ‘Good Samaritan Thesis’: 
 
The Good Samaritan Thesis: Abortion is morally permissible in all (or almost 
all) cases, whether or not the fetus is a person, because gestation is a form of Good 
Samaritanism – that is, it is a form of supererogatory assistance that no one 
person could be morally obligated to perform in order to preserve the life of 
another. Consequently, abortion does not kill the fetus, but only discontinues 
non-obligatory, life-preserving assistance. 
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The Good Samaritan Thesis (GST) claims that abortion is always or almost always 
permissible, whether the human fetus is a person or not. In effect, it bypasses the 
personhood question by stating that it is never, or hardly ever, morally obligatory 
for a woman to carry a pregnancy to term, even to save the life of another person. 
The most well-known iteration of the Good Samaritan Thesis comes in the way of 
an analogy drawn by Judith Thomson between pregnancy and a hypothetical 
situation in which a person is kidnapped by a musical society and forcibly connected 
to a famous, ailing violinist, whose unique kidney condition means that he needs to 
be connected to that person’s body for the next nine months in order to survive.1  
 
Another personhood-bypassing challenge of the same genus is what we might 
call The Justified Homicide Thesis, which claims the following: 
 
The Justified Homicide Thesis: Abortion is morally permissible in all (or 
almost all) cases, whether or not the fetus is a person, because it is a recognisable 
instance of justifiably killing another person. 
 
The Justified Homicide Thesis (JHT) begins by pointing out that our moral and 
legal principles make exceptions to the general prohibition on killing other persons, 
for instance in situations of self defence or absolute necessity, where killing one 
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1 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion 1 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 47-66 (1971). There is 
more to Thomson’s argument than GST alone suggests. For a detailed exposition and defence of 
Thomson’s argument, see David Boonin, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION (2003) chapter 4. 
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person, perhaps, one who is doomed imminently to die anyway, is the only way of 
saving more endangered human life.2 It then claims that if the fetus were a person, 
abortion would often or always fit those exceptions. JHT differs meaningfully from 
the GST in analysing abortion as an act of killing, not just the refusal to save. 
Hence, the two theses construct abortion’s permissibility in different ways. On JHT, 
abortion is an example of justified killing, and on GST, of a justified refusal to save 
life. 
 
 I am not going to assess the merits of the Good Samaritan Thesis or Justified 
Homicide Thesis. My concern is instead with personhood-bypassing challenges of 
the second kind, and with one notable example in particular. As I said, challenges of 
the second kind do not proceed by way of claiming that, in the final analysis, the 
permissibility of abortion does not depend upon whether the fetus is a person or not. 
They have an altogether different character, asserting that the personhood question 
is a fundamentally misconceived starting point for philosophical discussion and, or, 
legal reasoning about abortion.  
 
 Perhaps the most prevalent example of this sort of argument in modern 
moral philosophy is Ronald Dworkin’s intriguing retelling of the abortion debate in 
                                                 
2 Both exceptions are, naturally, subject to proportionality requirements. Actions taken in self defence 
must be not only necessary to resist the harm threatened by another person but also proportionate to 
that harm (one may not kill in self defence to avoid sustaining a minor injury). Homicides performed 
out of necessity are also subject to the proportionality requirement that more of value—namely, 
human life—is preserved by the killing than is lost by it (and even then, philosophers heavily dispute 
which side-constraints on necessity killing still apply). I will not be exploring these problems here, 
but it ought to be acknowledged that, in order to be convincing, the justified homicide thesis would 
need to show that abortion meets these conditions.  
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his 1993 book Life’s Dominion.3 There, Dworkin offered a compelling revision of the 
abortion problem, which centrally claimed that the traditional debate about prenatal 
personhood is really only a proxy for an essentially distinct, and more religious-like, 
kind of conflict about the intrinsic value of human life. Far from being about whether 
or not the human fetus is truly a person in the philosophical sense, Dworkin argued 
that the real dispute over abortion revolves around different understandings of 
human life’s intrinsic value, and whether or not abortion insults that value. 
 
 Moreover, he argued, failing to correctly diagnose the true nature of the 
conflict is also liable to induce a second mistaken belief: that abortion disagreement 
is politically intractable and resistant to principled compromise. Whereas the 
personhood-centered view of abortion argument leaves, as Dworkin saw it, little 
scope for principled resolution, once we are only able to understand what abortion 
argument is really about, a route to principled legal resolution within the context of 
continuing moral disagreement opens up by means of the doctrine of religious 
toleration. Dworkin’s account thus, as he put it, ‘contradicts the pessimistic 
conclusion that argument is irrelevant and accommodation impossible’ which seems 
so plainly to follow from the traditional view of the debate.4  
 
 Dworkin’s thesis is clearly set apart from other personhood-bypassing 
accounts of the abortion problem like GST or JHT, and in a way which gives it a 
certain argumentative priority over them. If he was correct to hypothesise that 
                                                 
3 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA 
(1993). 
 
4 ibid 23. 
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prenatal personhood is not, in any event, the crux of abortion disagreement, there 
will be little need to evaluate the other theses I outlined above, both of which set out 
to show that, despite appearances, whether the fetus is a person does not matter for 
our analysis of abortion. Consequently, there is good reason to attend to a thesis 
such as Dworkin’s right at the outset of any fresh examination of the rights and 
wrongs of abortion – at the beginning of the beginning, if you like.  
 
If correct, Dworkin’s main claims about abortion argument might also point 
toward a more profitable pedagogy when engaging in abortion discussion. If, as he 
surmised, those who believe that the rights and wrongs of abortion turn on prenatal 
personhood are, in truth, debating something of a wholly different order, then 
showing those discussants what an acceptable resolution could look like is less a 
matter of refuting those personhood-centred claims as it is getting them to 
appreciate their real reasons for making them. Lawyers and constitutional scholars 
in particular have no doubt found themselves drawn to the promise Dworkin held 
out for directing legal reasoning about abortion away from the intractable question 
of what constitutes personhood and into the more familiar territory of religious 
disagreement and toleration. 
 
 Be that as it may, in what follows I set out to show that Dworkin did not 
manage to displace the philosophical or legal primacy of the personhood issue in 
abortion argument. In particular, the main putative pay-off of Dworkin’s thesis—
that a principled political answer can be reached without positing an answer to the 
personhood question—is not forthcoming. I also contest Dworkin’s descriptive claim 
that prenatal personhood is not, in truth, what contestants in the public abortion 
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debate are disputing. My argument for this draws partly from the ascertainable ways 
in which the shape of that public disagreement has developed since Dworkin made 
his novel claim and from asking whether those developments bolster or undermine 
it.  
 
 Lastly, although I hold Dworkin’s view of the abortion problem to be 
incorrect, his argument in Life’s Dominion is replete with important and instructive 
insights for anyone approaching abortion from a moral or legal perspective. In the 
course of underscoring the core weaknesses of Dworkin’s contentions, I hope to 
bring into sharper focus the valuable contributions his thesis makes to abortion 
argument, which should continue to enrich and direct our reasoning about this 
perennially (and, even, increasingly) thorny issue. 
II. THE RED HERRING 
Before tracing the detail of Dworkin’s account, it is important to clarify the meaning 
of ‘person’ in the context of this discussion, especially in relation to the separate 
descriptor ‘human being’. Most moral philosophers distinguish between the 
classifications ‘person’ and ‘human being’, and Dworkin follows convention in this 
respect.5 The ascription ‘human being’ is a biological categorisation, capturing to 
any living creature that is genetically a member of the human species. Any human 
fetus, or, for that matter, newly formed zygote, is at least a human being in the bare 
sense that it is a form of human life. It is definitely not a frog, or a cat.  
 
                                                 
5 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 22. 
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The ascription ‘person’, on the other hand, refers to those beings which 
possess a certain kind of moral status, typically elaborated in terms of interests or 
rights, and yielding a cluster of normative implications concerning how it is morally 
acceptable to treat such beings. Precisely what all of these normative implications 
are is a matter of some dispute. At the very least, however, personhood status is 
taken to entail strict rules about the permissibility of killing creatures in possession 
of that status. It is never permissible to kill persons, no matter how painlessly, for 
reasons of convenience or (on most views) even to promote an appreciable level of 
welfare among other creatures or persons. The same is not generally believed to be 
true of non-persons. 
 
The analytical distinctness of human beings and persons is apparent from the 
fact that we can at least conceive of non-human persons: intelligent aliens, angels, 
perhaps even some non-human animals, can fit our concept of a person without 
being biologically human. So ‘human being’ and ‘person’ do not mean the same thing. 
It may be true, nevertheless, that all human beings are, necessarily, persons. This 
would be so if all members of the human species also happened to meet the 
conditions for personhood, making overlap between the categories one hundred per 
cent. The analytical separateness of the categories simply means that it is an open—
and hence, an intelligible—question whether or not this is so.  
Embracing this distinction, Dworkin addressed himself to the question 
whether disagreement about the personhood of the fetus is at the centre of conflict 
over abortion. In essence, he argued that the personhood issue is little more than a 
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red herring in abortion argument, failing to capture the real nature of the conflict, a 
conflict which he described in the following way: 
Opposing armies march down the streets or pack themselves into protests at 
abortion clinics, court houses, and the White House, screaming at and spitting 
on and loathing one another. Abortion is tearing America apart.6 
 
Argument about abortion is, Dworkin observed, both ‘fiercer and politically more 
important’ than any other public battle, including that over euthanasia. 7 Moreover, 
when conducted in the traditional terms of argument about prenatal personhood, 
that conflict also appears to be entirely intractable. This impasse owes substantially 
to the fact that, as Dworkin says, ‘neither side can offer any argument that the other 
must accept’, since different conclusions about the personhood of the fetus are only, 
ultimately, a matter of ‘primitive conviction’8. As he wrote: 
 
[T]here is no biological fact waiting to be discovered or crushing moral 
analogy waiting to be invented that can dispose of the matter. It is a question 
of primitive conviction, and the most we can ask of each side is not 
understanding of the other, or even respect, but just a pale civility, the kind of 
civility one might show an incomprehensible but dangerous Martian. 
 
On Dworkin’s view, those who see the fetus as equivalent to an unborn child 
from conception and those who view it as no more than a cluster of cells cannot hope 
                                                 
6 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 10. 
7 Ibid at 4. 
8 Ibid at 10. 
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to persuade each other otherwise by recourse to reason, for their beliefs are not 
grounded in reasoned argument to begin with, but only in basic intuition. 
Fundamentally, either we see the fetus as a person or we do not. Neither can 
discussants who give different answers to the personhood question be expected to 
harbour much sympathy for the political goals of their antagonists. Those for whom 
the fetus is metaphysically analogous to a born human being will not be moved by 
women’s rights arguments which, on their view, are blind to the fact that if a fetus is 
a helpless unborn child ‘then permitting abortion is permitting murder, and having 
an abortion is worse than abandoning an inconvenient infant to die’.9 Conversely, 
those who conceive of a fetus as something hardly different from a body part cannot 
help viewing the opponents of legal abortion as ‘either acting in deep error’ or out of 
bigotry, unreflective religiosity, or vindictiveness towards those whom they regard 
as fallen women.  
 
 As well as lacking any comprehension of or sympathy for one another’s 
positions, Dworkin believed that contestants in the abortion debate conflicted over 
the question of prenatal personhood have no hope of reaching any principled 
compromise, for their convictions do not permit that. Those who believe that that 
the human fetus is a full-fledged person cannot accept legal abortion on the basis of 
its democratic pedigree any more than dissidents of a genocidal state can accept its 
atrocities as the will of the masses. On the other hand, those who regard the notion 
of prenatal personhood as positively laughable cannot be expected to coolly accept 
the legal prohibition or restriction of abortion, with all of its profound negative 
                                                 
9 ibid 9-10. 
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implications for the lives of women, merely because enough of the population believe 
in a ludicrous proposition. And so Dworkin concludes: 
 
Self-respecting people who give opposite answers to whether the fetus is a 
person can no more compromise, or agree to live together allowing others to 
make their own decisions, than people can compromise about slavery or 
apartheid or rape… 
 
If the disagreement really is that stark, there can be no principled compromise 
but at best only a sullen and fragile standoff, defined by brute political power.10 
 
But Dworkin did not believe we should resign ourselves to this gloomy 
prognosis. This is because entire personhood-centered picture of the abortion 
conflict was, to his mind, based on a serious ‘intellectual confusion’. 11  A good 
indication that the real nub of that disagreement is something other than as first 
appears comes in the way of what Dworkin called  ‘signal inconsistencies’ in 
attitudes to abortion on both sides of the divide. Opponents of abortion rights, for 
instance, commonly make concessions where abortion is necessary to save the life of 
the pregnant woman, or where pregnancy is the result of incest or rape. 
Furthermore, many are willing to allow that, although abortion is immoral, it should 
nevertheless be legally permitted, that it ought not to invoke the same penalties as 
murder, or that despite their moral objection, they would support their own wife, 
daughter, or friend if she decided to obtain one.  
                                                 
10 ibid 10. 
11 ibid. 
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Some ‘signal inconsistencies’ echo on the “pro-choice” side too. While 
supporters of abortion rights clearly do not regard abortion as murder, they do 
frequently characterise it as a kind of a ‘cosmic shame’, and a ‘grave moral decision’, 
not to be undertaken lightly or for trivial reasons, for example because the 
pregnancy will interfere with a booked holiday. Consequently, they often support 
some legal restrictions on abortion choice, notwithstanding their beliefs that the 
fetus is not a person in the philosophical sense. 
 
Dworkin pointed out that on the personhood-centered picture of abortion 
argument, these results seem ‘baffling’12. For how could someone who truly believes 
that abortion kills a person consign the abortion decision to the realm of personal 
morality, or make concessions where pregnancy is brought about through rape? And 
why would someone who, say, thinks that abortion is not very different from a 
tonsillectomy view it as something obviously to be regretted, or the appropriate 
target of any legal restrictions? The concessions and exceptions commonly made on 
both sides are, he suggested, flatly inconsistent with the traditional account of the 
abortion conflict. Regarding the concessions made in particular by moral opponents 
of abortion, he remarked:  
 
No one can consistently hold that a fetus has a right not to be killed and at the 
same time hold it wrong for the government to protect that right by the 
criminal law. The most basic responsibility of government, after all, is to 
                                                 
12 ibid 14. 
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protect the interests of everyone in the community, particularly the interests of 
those who cannot protect themselves.13 
 
However, Dworkin argued, the signal inconsistencies are explicable once the conflict 
is recast in a different light. Central to a better understanding of abortion 
disagreement, he claimed, is a distinction between two very different grounds of 
objection to abortion captured by the interest in ‘protecting fetal life’. That interest 
can, in the one place, refer to what he called the derivative objection to abortion. The 
derivative objection claims that abortion violates the fetus’s right not to be killed, a 
right which all persons possess. On this understanding, the wrongness of abortion 
derives from the fetus’s individual right to life.  
 
But ‘protecting fetal life’ can implicate a very different ground of abortion 
opposition. Dworkin labelled this the detached objection to abortion, because it does 
not depend on ascribing any rights or interests to the individual fetus. The detached 
objection claims that all human life has a sacred or, in secular terms, intrinsic value, 
like the value we might ascribe to a brilliant work of art or find in natural beauty. 
The objection claims that abortion is wrong not because it violates a fetus’s right to 
life, but because it ‘disregards or insults’ that intrinsic value.14  
 
The detached objection differs critically from the derivative one in that it does 
not rely in any way on the claim that a fetus is a person or has rights and interests of 
its own. Nevertheless, Dworkin argued, someone who does not regard the fetus as a 
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person may still ‘object to abortion just as strenuously as someone who insists it is’ if 
his objection is rooted in detached grounds. 15  Just as someone might object to 
turning off the life-support of a patient with an incurable and intolerable illness not 
because of the belief that death is against her interests, but because the act of killing 
insults the intrinsic value of human life, so too might a person object to abortion not 
because she regards the fetus as having an interest in continued life, but because she 
views the extinguishing of any human life as an unacceptable affront to life’s 
intrinsic value. 
 
Dworkin believed that almost everyone who objects to abortion practice truly 
objects to it, ‘as they might realise after reflection’, on the detached rather than the 
derivative ground.16 In other words, the ground of their objection is not their belief 
in the personhood of the fetus, even if they take it to be thus, but rather their 
commitment to the more impersonal, intrinsic value of human life, similar in its 
nature to the value we attribute to beautiful works of art or to endangered animal 
species whose preservation we take to be a good in itself. Once we understand this, 
Dworkin claims we can make far better sense of why some people think that 
abortion is wrong but ought to remain legal, while others think it acceptable, but 
legitimately regulated. It is perfectly ‘consistent’, he says, for someone who objects 
to abortion on detached grounds to hold that it is ‘intrinsically wrong’ to end a 
human life, but that the decision whether or not to end that life in utero must be left 
to the pregnant woman.17  
                                                 
15 ibid 12. 
16 ibid 13. 
17 ibid 15. 
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Moreover, on the detached picture of abortion disagreement, supporters of 
abortion rights actually share this appreciation of human life’s intrinsic value. They 
too believe that all human life is extremely valuable, and that its destruction is 
always regrettable – always a ‘cosmic shame’. Thus we should not be surprised that 
defenders of abortion rights are still sobered by the need for abortion and, 
frequently, support some restrictions. 
 
This all raises a question, however. If disputants on both sides of the debate 
share a commitment to the intrinsic value of human life, what are they arguing 
about? Dworkin’s answer is that people interpret this value in drastically different 
ways. He wrote: 
 
How can a shared assumption explain the terrible divisions about abortion that 
are tearing us apart? The answer, I believe, is that we interpret the idea that 
human life is intrinsically valuable in different ways, and that the different 
impulses and convictions expressed in these competing interpretations are 
very powerful and passionate.18 
 
Later in the book, Dworkin offered an account of how different 
interpretations of life’s intrinsic value might sponsor radically different conclusions 
on the abortion question. More fully, he distinguishes between two different sources 
of human life’s intrinsic value: natural creation and human creative investment. Those 
who place more stock in natural or biological creation are more likely to conclude 
                                                 
18 ibid 70.  
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that the intrinsic value of human life is always insulted when abortion is carried out. 
But not everyone will agree that premature death in the womb is the most serious 
frustration of human life. 19  Others may believe that performing an abortion is 
consistent with human life’s intrinsic value if it prevents significant human creative 
investment in the life of the pregnant woman from being squandered. Disagreement 
about abortion is, in short, disagreement about which ‘mode’ of life’s intrinsic value 
has the greater moral importance. While conservatives in the abortion debate are 
likely to think that natural investment in the form of biological life is pre-eminent, 
liberals more frequently believe that it is a bigger frustration of life’s miracle when 
an adult human being’s expectations are disappointed and talents wasted than when 
a fetus dies before any comparable investment in its life is made.20 
 
 From all of this, Dworkin draws his significant conclusion about political 
resolution of the abortion question. Crucially, he argues that disagreement about the 
meaning and nature of life’s intrinsic value has a ‘quasi-religious’ quality. Our 
personal interpretations of that value are, he says, ‘essentially religious beliefs’, 
relating, as they do, to questions about the meaning of life and death. The end 
picture is therefore of a conflict which is ‘at bottom spiritual’.21 But recognising the 
religious nature of abortion argument has important implications for the possibility 
of principled compromise. For, once the conflict is translated into these terms—into 
a matter of religious-like difference—a pathway to principled resolution is laid out by 
the doctrine of religious toleration. As Dworkin remarked, ‘We think that it is a 
                                                 
19 ibid at 90. 
20 See chapter 3 generally, especially 91. 
21 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 101. 
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terrible form of tyranny, destructive of moral responsibility, for the community to 
impose tenets of spiritual faith or conviction on individuals.’22 In modern pluralistic 
democracies, the protection of free exercise of religion therefore undergirds a 
permissive answer to the question of abortion’s legality. Since everyone must be free 
to express her religious beliefs, for or against abortion, the state cannot coercively 
remove the abortion option. This is a conclusion which, Dworkin suggests, all those 
morally opposed to abortion have reason to accept if they are committed to religious 
toleration. 
 
Finally, when equipped with the ‘detached’ account, Dworkin believes we can 
better make sense not only of the moral controversy, but also of the constitutional 
saga over abortion in the United States – particularly the legal arguments 
surrounding Roe v Wade, the landmark Supreme Court ruling which recognised, for 
the first time, that the Constitution granted a fundamental right to termination of 
pregnancy.23 Building on his assimilation of abortion disagreement with religious 
disagreement, Dworkin argues that freedom of choice about abortion has a clear 
textual basis in the US Constitution. If, as he claims, beliefs about reproductive 
freedom are ‘essentially religious’, then the right to make one’s own decisions in such 
matters can be construed out of the First Amendment, which guarantees the free 
exercise of religion. Contrary to common assumptions, he suggests that the on-
going constitutional dispute about abortion is not whether individual states have the 
constitutional power to declare the fetus a person, for, he argued, they plainly do 
not. Rather, the salient question becomes whether state legislatures have the 
                                                 
22 Ibid at 20. 
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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constitutional power to dictate the intrinsic values which their citizens must respect 
and how they must respect them. In short, can a state ‘impose the majority’s 
conception of the sacred on everyone’?24  
 
This account, Dworkin argues, accords far better with the central legal 
question in Roe v Wade and the basis of scholarly objection to it. As was made 
evident in Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion, it was never conceivable that the Roe 
court could have declared the fetus a person for the purposes of constitutional 
protection – or so Dworkin claims. Since all good constitutional lawyers presumably 
appreciate this, he suggests that the real ground of lawyerly objection to Roe must 
concern some other part of the ruling, as the wealth of critical focus on the issue of 
state autonomy over abortion law would suggest. Unlike the personhood issue, the 
question if and when a government can coerce respect for an intrinsic value, and 
determine the form that respect must take, is an altogether more complex constitutional 
question about which we should anticipate serious scholarly disagreement.  
III. ‘SIGNAL INCONSISTENCIES’ AND THE DESCRITPIVE CLAIM 
As we have seen, a key aspect of Dworkin’s account is the descriptive claim that 
prenatal personhood is not, in actual fact, at the root of public controversy over 
abortion—that it is not what people are arguing about—and that the features of that 
controversy can be better explained when adopting the ‘detached’ account of 
abortion’s contestedness. It is with this claim that I wish to start. Scrutinizing it 
involves asking firstly, whether there is anything about public abortion conflict 
which stands in need of a special explanation (such as that people are mistaken about 
                                                 
24 Ibid 159. 
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the grounds of their disagreement), and, secondly, whether that explanation cannot 
be found within the derivative account. 
 One of Dworkin’s main arguments, we saw, was that ‘signal inconsistencies’ 
on both sides of the abortion divide are simply a bad fit with the derivative account 
which casts abortion disagreement as disagreement about prenatal personhood. He 
did not reach far, however, for alternative explanations of those putative 
inconsistencies that are more in keeping with a personhood-centred view of abortion 
conflict, despite the fact that some present themselves. In truth, we should not be at 
all surprised to find that many people hold ambivalent and even somewhat 
contradictory views on such a philosophically complex, politicised and emotively 
charged subject as abortion. Such inconsistencies, which are not special to abortion 
argument, could owe to any number of things. In the first place, the holders of those 
views may simply have not thought through their position with much analytical 
rigour, sheer lack of reflectiveness being, presumably, the most common source of 
argumentative incoherence. Alternatively, disputants may be led to embrace 
inconsistent concessions because of emotional or psychological biases, fear of social 
reproach, or even the need to disingenuously advocate compromise positions for 
politically strategic reasons.  
 
Of all these possible explanations, strategic necessity strikes one as the most 
plausible reason why political opponents and supporters of abortion rights often 
make concessions which look like signal inconsistencies. Ideological opponents of 
abortion may support exceptions in cases of rape, incest, or grave risk to the 
pregnant woman’s life for a host of pragmatic reasons: to avoid ostracising 
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moderates; to focus firepower on the more winnable battles, and so on. If the 
strategic explanation were correct, we might well expect to see those opponents 
withdrawing the traditional concessions as and when political climates change and 
platforms can be radicalised without risking too much of the overall objective: to 
preserve as much fetal life as possible. The “ironing out” of some signal 
inconsistencies might be observable from the introduction of new state laws 
criminalising negligent pregnant behaviour (such as drug taking) which results in 
harm to or death of the fetus. 25  The putative inconsistency here is the lack of 
willingness to subject such women to the same consequences in law they would face 
for negligently harming their born children. If the fetus is just the same as a child, 
why should the criminal consequences of causing it harm differ? The more, then, 
that fetal harm laws are brought into line with laws prohibiting child abuse, , the 
more this ‘inconsistency’ begins to look merely like an inauthentic concession of 
long-standing by opponents of abortion. 
 
Moreover, the derivative account explains perfectly well why ideologically 
inauthentic concessions such as rape or risk-to-life exceptions could be easily 
justified for opponents of abortion. If the fetus is indeed the moral equivalent of a 
                                                 
25 See, for example, amendment SB 1391 to Tennessee’s fetal homicide law (Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 39-
13-107 & 39-13-214), allowing a woman to be prosecuted for the illegal use of a narcotic while 
pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is 
a result of her illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant. A similar bill (SB 599) was 
introduced into the Oklahoma Senate this year (see 
http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=sb559). On April 3rd 2015, Indiana resident Purvi 
Patel became the first pregnant woman found guilty of violating a fetal homicide law, and was 
sentenced to 20 years in jail. While feticide laws have long existed in many American states, reliance 
on one to convict a woman of her own fetus’s homicide was an unprecedented development. 
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helpless child, any strategy which promises to gain the most ground in the wider 
political battle looks rationally defensible, even if it involves advocating 
disingenuous compromise positions. Theoretical consistency does not count for 
much when weighed against the value of preventing as much infanticide as possible. 
Hence, anti-abortion protest which seeks to direct a special degree of moral 
opprobrium at late abortion will be intelligible on the derivative account if there is 
any reason to think that it presents the best shot at preventing some fetal deaths (say, 
because it is easier to mobilise general opposition to late abortion than to early 
abortion), even if contradicts the protesters’ true convictions that all abortion is 
tantamount to homicide. 
 
 On the other side of things, ostensible inconsistencies demonstrated by 
defenders of abortion rights might equally be explained by a political need to make 
concessions. Abortion rights campaigners often admit that abortion is always sad or 
a shame, even when justified. Although this admission does not chime well with the 
extremely low moral status they accord to the fetus (if nothing of significant moral 
standing is lost, why such a shame?), it can help to placate moderate sensibilities.  
 
As well as being tenable, mundane explanations like these are perfectly 
consistent with the pre-eminence of prenatal personhood in abortion disagreement. 
Rather than offering the explanation that what disputants in the abortion debate say 
they believe about fetal personhood does not reflect their true beliefs, this 
explanation suggests that the attitudes which demonstrate signal inconsistencies are 
themselves inauthentic.  
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 Aside from scepticism about whether the signal inconsistencies really run deep, 
it might be thought that Dworkin’s appeal to them as evidence that disputants are 
not really arguing about fetal personhood also relies on a claim that we should 
hesitate to accept: that no one could be seriously be engaged in a particular 
theoretical dispute unless his position in that dispute were coherent through and 
through. Frances Kamm labelled this the ‘No Wrong Belief View’, that is, the view 
that no one engaged in abortion debate could hold an inconsistent belief, and, hence, 
that nothing about the moves in that debate could be explained by sheer 
inconsistency. 26  As Kamm argued, there is no basis whatsoever for Dworkin 
maintaining the complete coherence of public attitudes as a premise in his 
investigations. By ruling out the possibility that disputants could simply be 
inconsistent on some points, it seems that Dworkin was jumping too quickly to the 
conclusion that abortion disagreement must be about something else. 
 
 Perhaps Kamm was unfair to attribute such a plainly unreasonable view as the 
‘No Wrong Belief View’ to Dworkin. Rather than suggesting that there are no such 
things as inconsistent beliefs, we might take Dworkin simply to have been 
presenting the signal inconsistencies as compelling evidence that the personhood 
debate is a red herring. Perhaps abortion disagreement is about fetal personhood, 
notwithstanding those perplexing attitudes. But they are at least good reason to 
think otherwise. An argument like this would not commit Dworkin to the No 
Wrong Belief View. Nevertheless, by failing to consider credible alternative 
                                                 
26 Frances Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95 COLUMBIA L.R. 
(1995). 
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explanations for some inconsistent positions, Dworkin gave them an unreasonable 
amount of credence as evidence against the derivative account.  
 
 I have suggested that Dworkin may have been wrong to take ‘signal 
inconsistencies’ at face value. However, inasmuch as the dichotomous attitudes he 
was describing are genuinely held by protagonists in the abortion debate, one might 
even question whether they are necessarily inconsistent with the derivative account. 
Take, for instance, those abortion protestors who do not, in all respects, seem to 
equate abortion with murder. One reason they may fail to do so is not because they 
equivocate about fetal personhood, but because they entertain the possibility 
(consciously or not) that abortion is an instance of justified homicide, or amounts to 
the mere failure to be a Good Samaritan. Uncertainty about those questions—in 
other words, about JHT and GST—is entirely consistent with the belief that the 
fetus has the same interest in continued life as all born human beings. (As we saw at 
the beginning, JHT and GST only really become relevant once fetal personhood is 
presumed).  
 
 Someone who regards abortion as something other than murder for either of 
these reasons would continue to regard it as extremely morally grave and 
regrettable – something to be avoided as much as possible, as is true of justified 
killing in self-defence. Still, even on this picture, fetal personhood remains squarely 
at the centre of abortion disagreement. For, whether they equate abortion with 
murder or not, the moral and legal issue with abortion comes, for the abortion 
opponent, from the fact that the death of the fetus is tantamount to the death of a 
person. It is only this belief which renders abortion so morally problematic for the 
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protestor – the kind of act which only stops short of being murder if GST or JHT 
were true. For defenders of abortion rights who think fetal personhood a ludicrous 
proposition, abortion does not, to begin with, have such a morally troublesome 
character. 
 
 But defenders of abortion rights may nevertheless acknowledge some value in 
the fetus or concede that abortion is always, in some measure, a ‘cosmic shame’, 
without thereby contradicting their fundamental belief that the fetus is not a person, 
or belittling the importance of that belief in their wider argument. There is no 
inconsistency in denying the personhood of the fetus whilst affirming the intrinsic 
value of all biological human life. To this Dworkin could have no objection, since he 
suggested that all contributors to abortion debate share a reasonable belief in that 
intrinsic value, no matter what their views on prenatal personhood. Again, none of 
this uproots the centrality of fetal personhood, or its denial, for abortion 
disagreement. The refusal to attribute personhood status to the fetus is still pivotal 
for the abortion rights advocate’s failure to treat abortion as in any respect akin to 
murder, and hence for her broad support of abortion practice, even if it involves 
extinguishing something of value. 
 
In sum, then, there may be little about the public abortion conflict that is left 
inexplicable on the derivative account. But for what it is worth, the derivative 
account also commands its own fair share of explanatory power, and in some 
respects outperforms the detached account in this regard. Dworkin duly notes that 
the abortion conflict is uniquely ferocious as compared with practically all other 
public disagreements. But this feature accords far better with the derivative than 
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with the detached version of the controversy. The escalation to violence, which has 
punctuated that conflict at times (and again recently) is certainly more explicable 
when opposition to abortion is understood in terms of the derivative claim that 
abortion unjustly kills a human child. As a response to the belief that abortion 
murders children, the shooting of abortionists is at least intelligible, if not justified. 
Somewhat less so when it is understood as the expression of just one interpretation 
of the intrinsic value of human life.  
 
 Of course, the content of anti-abortion rhetoric has long been of the kind 
which lends a good deal of support to the derivative view of abortion opposition. 
Verbal and pictorial protest messages invoke the language and imagery of murder, 
both implicitly and explicitly drawing a metaphysical equivalence between fetuses 
and babies. Anticipating this evidence in favour of the derivative view, Dworkin 
countered that opponents of abortion in fact only employ the rhetoric of murder in 
order to emphasise their objection based on the sanctity of human life.27 Talk of 
murdering babies simply packs more punch than spiritualistic rhetoric about life’s 
sacred value, although the real basis for opposition was always the latter, he argued. 
Dworkin’s retort has some initial plausibility. But the idea that the anti-abortion 
movement’s assimilation of abortion with murder is empty rhetoric is increasingly 
                                                 
27 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 20-21. On page 21, he says: “They declare that abortion is murder, or just 
as bad as murder, and they insist that human life begins at conception, or that a fetus is a person from 
the beginning, not because they think a fetus has rights and interests but just to emphasise the depth 
of their feeling that abortion is wrong because it is the deliberate destruction of the life of a human 
organism…We must be careful not to be led by emotionally charged descriptions about human life 
and persons and murder that reveal strong emotions but are not a clear guide to the beliefs that 
people are emotional about.” 
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difficult to accept, especially in light of the numerous recent attempts at state-level 
to enact ‘personhood amendments’ which would redefine constitutional personhood 
as beginning from conception. 28  If successful, such amendments would have the 
effect of outlawing most, if not all, abortion in the given state, in direct 
contravention of Roe v Wade. Less conspicuously, they would also, presumably, have 
the effect of prohibiting embryo research and fertility treatments like IVF, which 
involve embryo wastage, an implication that has not deterred their proponents. 
 
 The ‘personhood movement’ is the most unequivocal demonstration of the 
anti-abortion movement’s depth of commitment to the belief that personhood begins 
at conception, and indubitably goes far beyond mere rhetoric. But ‘personhood 
amendments’ are by no means the only legislative attempts to restrict abortion 
which have at their heart the suggestion that the fetus is a morally considerable 
subject, and/or the aim to present it in such a way to those contemplating abortion 
choice. Measures of the kind include: the expansion of criminal liability for the abuse 
and neglect of fetuses (The federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act 2004 recognised 
a ‘child in utero’ as a potential legal victim if killed or injured during the commission 
of a number of violent crimes) 29 ; abortion restrictions that have relied on the 
                                                 
28 In 2011 alone, 14 state legislatures introduced 26 ‘personhood’ measures. There have been failed 
attempts to pass such legislation by voter ballot in Colorado, Iowa and Mississippi and North Dakota. 
See, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-personhood.pdf (last accessed 
September 10, 2015). 
 
29 See Sara Dubow, OURSELVES UNBORN: A HISTORY OF THE FETUS IN MODERN AMERICA 
(2011), at 139-146. Dubow documents that between 1977 and 1998, at least 200 women in 30 states 
were prosecuted for crimes of fetal abuse, which included prenatal narcotics exposure crimes. 
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proposition that ‘fetal pain’ is experienced during abortion, 30 and, most recently, 
mandatory pre-abortion ultrasound scanning and information laws (dubbed, 
‘women’s right to know’ laws), which seek to dissuade women out of abortion choice 
by requiring medical staff to show them, and, or, describe to them, a sonogram 
image of their fetus.31 Legislative moves such as these draw heavily on the prenatal 
personhood narrative, either being rationalised by, or attempting to facilitate 
revelation of, the fact that the fetus has interests similar or equal to that of born 
human beings. 
 
                                                 
30  The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 2003, which prohibited almost absolutely a particularly 
controversial method of late abortion, cited ‘congressional findings’ that ‘unborn infants’ past a 
certain gestational age are caused pain by the procedure. The constitutionality of the 2003 Act was 
challenged but upheld in the Supreme Court in Gonzales v Carhart 550 US 124 (2007). In May 2015, 
the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act also passed through House of Representatives. The 
Act seeks to ban all abortion after 20 weeks, explicitly on grounds of fetal pain, apart from in 
exceptional circumstances. It has yet to pass in the Senate, however. 41 states already have bans on 
late-term abortions. Since the 2013 Act passed through the House of Representatives, 25 states have 
considered similar legislation related to fetal pain and/or fetal anesthesia. In Nebraska, a statute 
banning abortion after 20 weeks on grounds of fetal pain was passed in 2010. Eight states – Arkansas, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Alaska, South Dakota, and Texas – have passed laws 
mandating information on fetal pain in their state issued abortion-counseling literature. (See: 
https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf). 
 
 
31  The plain objective of such regulations is to provoke revelation of what is thought by their 
proponents to be a self-evident truth: that the fetus is not just a burgeoning human life, but a fully-
instantiated, rights-bearing person. For a good description of different state versions of the law, see 
Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice 56 UCLA L. 
Rev. 351 (2008). Some states require the provider to show and describe the image; others provide that 
she may decline to see or look away, though her decision to do so must be recorded. The Texas 
version of the law requires the practitioner to make the fetus’s heart beat audible to the pregnant 
woman. 
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 All of this renders the derivative view quite difficult to resist. To be sure, 
Dworkin may well have responded by insisting that these are yet more red herrings, 
indicating at most that opponents of abortion are rhetorically committed to the 
narrative of prenatal personhood, not that they are truly, deeply committed to it. But 
the wisdom of Occam’s Razor should prompt us to reject his alternative explanations 
in the absence of a clear need for them. Dworkin believed that the rhetoric and 
ferociousness of the abortion conflict is explained by the fact that disputants are 
conflicted over an essentially spiritual issue, whilst being mistaken about the true 
grounds of their disagreement. The far simpler and more obvious explanation is that 
one side in the conflict really does believe that murder is at stake, while the other 
side believes the idea so preposterous that bigotry and oppression is all that they can 
see as left to be marshalled against them. 
 
Lastly, if today’s opponents of abortion really are mistaken about their 
grounds of opposition, then it seems they are quite deeply and irreversibly mistaken. 
And if the mistake is indeed so deeply entrenched, one may even wonder how 
worthwhile it is to attempt to reconceive their entire argument for them, rather than 
to address that objection on its own terms. This pedagogical point also leads on to a 
further question about what space Dworkin thinks exists between vehemently 
believing one’s grounds of opposition to a practice are X and one’s grounds actually 
being X. It may be true that, in one way, moral thinking is less the process of 
changing one’s mind as it is discovering what, upon reflection, one already believed 
to be true. But this is no truer of our beliefs about the moral status of the fetus as it 
is about anything else.  If critics of abortion are firmly enough convinced that their 
objection lies in the fact that the human fetus is as much a person as the typical, 
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adult human being, and that abortion and murder are therefore of a piece, it may 
well be asked in what sense their ‘actual’ claims consist in something different.  
 
IV. THE ‘ANTI-PERSONHOOD’ ARGUMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISPUTE 
Up to this point, I have been examining the proposition that prenatal personhood is 
not what public abortion argument is about. But one might well ask why, as 
philosophers or lawyers, we ought to be interested at all in the nature of public 
discourse, coherent, rigorous or otherwise. After all, the terms of that discourse do 
not necessarily bear any relation to the philosophically and legally pertinent issues 
in abortion. Why should it even matter? 
It is clear that Dworkin’s claims about the nature of abortion controversy are 
not meant to be mere descriptions of the public argument. That is, Dworkin was, 
very clearly, also making the stronger claim that prenatal personhood—or, the 
‘derivative’ question—is not what is philosophically and legally salient in abortion. 
One important argument for that claim comes in the way of his contention that no 
one could sensibly regard the fetus as a person with rights and interests of its own, 
‘in particular an interest in not being destroyed’—from the moment of its 
conception. 32  This is because the fetus has never possessed any mental life, 
something Dworkin sees as an essential pre-requisite of having such interests. 
Comparing early fetuses to the assemblage of body parts on Dr. Frankenstein’s table 
before the lever is pulled, he insists: 
                                                 
32 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 15. 
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…it makes no sense to suppose that something has interests of its own—as 
distinct from its being important what happens to it—unless it has, or has 
had, some form of consciousness: some mental as well as physical life.33 
 
He may, of course, be right about that. But as Frances Kamm pointed out, 
Dworkin’s assertion here looks less to be evidence of the irrelevancy of prenatal 
personhood in abortion as it is an ‘anti-personhood argument’.34 The fact that Dworkin 
himself finds the notion of prenatal personhood quite implausible (a claim which, 
apart from asserting the necessity of mental states for interests, he does not 
accompany with a great deal of argument35) does not go to show that the derivative 
view of the abortion problem is false. This is because the primacy of the derivative 
question in our philosophical inquiries about abortion can still be demonstrated 
simply by attending to the fact that were the fetus a person, abortion would seem to 
be (absent justification) tantamount to murder. Dworkin cannot therefore dismiss 
the philosophical importance of the derivative question only by arguing that no 
sensible discussant would classify the fetus as a person. 
 
Nor does the anti-personhood argument further Dworkin’s descriptive claim 
that the personhood issue does not form the content of the claims on either side of 
the abortion conflict. In underlining the ludicrousness of the idea that a being 
                                                 
33 Ibid at 16. 
34 Kamm, supra note 26, at 167. My emphasis.  
35 Don Marquis commented that Dworkin accompanied this ‘crucial assertion’—that interests require 
some form of consciousness—‘with no argument whatsoever’, even though ‘his analysis of the ethics 
of abortion collapses if it is untrue’ (see Don Marquis, Life, Death and Dworkin (Review Essay), 22 
PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM 127-131 (1996). 
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lacking in mental states could be a rights-bearing person, Dworkin sought to 
provide yet more evidence that disputants must be arguing about something else. It 
is, however, a strange kind of evidence which just impresses the argument of one 
side of the personhood debate. The strength of Dworkin’s own conviction that 
personhood must supervene on particular mental states does not make it 
implausible, or any less likely, that many understand personhood’s conditions to be 
different, and object to abortion for precisely that reason. 
 
 But Dworkin’s claims about the true nature of the abortion problem were not 
restricted to the moral realm. Alongside his arguments about the moral controversy, 
Dworkin made the parallel claim that the detached, rather than the derivative, 
question is what lies at the heart of constitutional disagreement about abortion. He 
argued that the main features of that disagreement—and especially, the nature of 
scholarly objection to Roe v Wade—reflect the detached dispute far more so than the 
derivative. In short, different views about prenatal personhood are not what explain 
disagreement about abortion’s constitutionality. 
 
 One reason for this claim stems from Dworkin’s observation of a particular 
‘signal inconsistency’ inhering in scholarly objections to the Roe v Wade decision, if 
dispute about prenatal personhood is thought to be the crux of the constitutional 
tussle. In the wake of Roe, scholars critical of the decision largely contested the 
ruling not because of the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognise the fetus as a person 
under the US Constitution, a conclusion that Dworkin argued was legally inevitable, 
but because of their belief that the Court should have left individual states free to 
determine their own abortion laws as they always had done. As Dworkin explained, 
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however, this core objection to Roe, based on the value of state autonomy, is, in a 
significant way, incompatible with the view that the fetus is a person for the 
purposes of the Constitution, and that the Roe court erred in determining differently.  
This is because, he suggested, those whose objection to Roe sprang from the belief 
that the fetus is a person under the Constitution would not be able to argue, as they 
did, that the Court should have left states free to prohibit or permit abortion as they 
choose. For, if the fetus is a constitutional person, ‘then states not only may forbid 
abortion but in some circumstances must do so’.36 Put differently, if fetuses are indeed 
owed equal protection under the 14th Amendment, then states cannot be left free to 
choose the abortion laws they wish, since permissive abortion laws will breach 
fetuses’ constitutional rights. From this Dworkin concluded that academic 
opponents of Roe who have directed their scholarly objection at the issue of state 
autonomy over abortion law cannot, at the same time, object to Roe on the ground 
that the fetus is a constitutional person.  
 
This tension dissipates, however, as soon as soon as the constitutional 
dispute is translated into detached terms, or so Dworkin argues. On this view, 
scholars objecting to Roe do not truly do so on the ground that the fetus is owed 
constitutional personhood, but because of the belief that states may have ‘a 
compelling detached reason for prohibiting abortion’: to protect the inviolability of 
human life. Those scholars who disputed Roe in defence of state autonomy could 
presumably claim that states ought to be free to legislate to protect fetal life if they 
so chose, but not that the Constitution requires them to forbid abortion, which would 
follow from a recognition of fetal constitutional personhood. On this understanding, 
                                                 
36 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 16. 
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the core legal question then becomes whether governments should ‘attempt to 
dictate to its citizens what intrinsic values they will recognise, and why, and how’, 
including what this means for abortion.37 In other words, should states be permitted 
to impose the majority’s conception of the sacred on everyone? This view of the core 
legal dispute accords quite well with the prominence of the state autonomy issue in 
academic argument, with those objecting to Roe believing that individual states 
ought to be allowed to dictate to their citizens what the intrinsic vale of human life 
means vis-à-vis abortion, and those supporting Roe believing that they cannot.  
 
Dworkin’s detached reading of the constitutional issue is bolstered by his 
claim that there simply is no legally respectable objection to the Roe Court’s 
conclusion that the fetus lacked the status of a person under the Constitution. At the 
time Roe was decided, the fetus had never been recognised as a constitutional person 
under US law. Texas, the state whose abortion legislation was under scrutiny, 
argued before the court that the fetus was indeed a person within the meaning of the 
14th Amendment. Justice Blackmun firmly held that the law had never treated 
fetuses as constitutional persons and could not expand the category now. This was 
despite his acknowledgment that, had the fetus held the status of a person under the 
14th Amendment, it would be entitled to equal protection and abortion would be 
rendered largely unconstitutional. Dworkin accepted this conditional claim about 
what would follow if the fetus were granted constitutional personhood, but 
emphatically endorsed Roe’s ruling that it lacked such protected status. In fact, he 
regarded it as legally unthinkable that the Court could have come to any other 
decision on this point. As he wrote, ‘almost all responsible lawyers’ agree that Justice 
                                                 
37 Ibid at 117. 
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Blackmun’s opinion on the personhood question was correct, since there was no 
precedent in US law for the proposition that the fetus is a person, and the Supreme 
Court surely lacked the power to recognise new kinds of constitutional persons.38  
 
Dworkin concludes from this there is no credible ground of scholarly 
objection to the Roe Court’s conclusion on the personhood question. If Roe v Wade 
and its main successor case, Planned Parenthood v Casey,39 were bad law, this could 
not be because of any legal mistake about fetal personhood. 
 
 Dworkin’s exposition of the tension between the claim that the fetus is owed 
constitutional personhood and that states ought to be left free to determine their 
own abortion laws is incisive for constitutional scholars. As between fetal 
constitutional personhood and state autonomy over abortion, it is, apparently, one or 
the other; state freedom to grant abortion rights cannot be tolerated if the fetus is a 
person. Still, it does not necessarily follow that Dworkin is correct about the main 
question for the constitutionality of abortion. 
 
 To start with, lawyers who disagree with Roe because they view the fetus so 
plainly as a person in the philosophical sense are not barred from objecting to Roe on 
different legal grounds. Even those who concede the legal inevitability of that part of 
Roe’s ruling can have good reason to challenge the decision on alternative grounds, 
especially if those grounds present the more promising routes to reversing the 
decision and curtailing abortion rights. In conservative states at least, a legal defeat 
                                                 
38 Ibid at 110. 
 
39 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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of Roe based on the Supreme Court’s misappropriation of state autonomy would still 
yield the desired result: the prohibition of abortion. And if, as those who hold the 
derivative objection believe, abortion unjustly kills persons, any effective legal 
argument against the constitutional right to a termination is presumably as good as 
any other. 
 
 Next, scholars objecting to Roe on state autonomy grounds need not embrace 
incoherence if they are also committed to the normative claim that, being a person 
(as they see it) in the moral sense, a fetus ought to have its personhood recognised 
by the Constitution. A legal case in favour of states retaining autonomy to permit or 
prohibit abortion as they see fit could begin by granting, for the sake of argument, 
Roe’s conclusion on the personhood issue. In other words, a lawyer might argue that 
once it is accepted that the fetus lacks constitutional status, the correct legal 
conclusion is that states should be free to determine their own abortion laws. 
Correct or not, there is nothing inconsistent about this position, which in no way 
commits its proponents to endorsing the Roe majority’s refusal to extend 
constitutional personhood to the fetus. 
 
This said, a considerable amount of contemporary objection to Roe does 
explicitly target its ruling on fetal personhood, as the ‘personhood amendment’ 
movement demonstrates.40  This brings us to Dworkin’s stronger claim that the 
fetus’s personhood status is simply not constitutionally salient. As seen, this claim 
                                                 
40 The adoption of a constitutional amendment to grant the fetus personhood status under the 14th 
Amendment is currently a core tenet of the Republican National Committee’s platform on abortion. 
See, https://www.gop.com/platform/we-the-people/. 
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rests in what Dworkin perceives as the undeniability of Roe’s conclusion on fetal 
personhood as a question of law. Since there was no precedent for recognising the 
fetus as a subject of protection under the 14th Amendment, Dworkin argued that a 
contrary ruling would have been legally unsupportable. He did, however, 
acknowledge the fact that the Supreme Court has been known to upend conventional 
understandings of the Constitution on questions as fundamental as this – citing 
Brown v Topeka Board of Education 41  as a standout example. What, then, of the 
possibility that the Supreme Court might have broken with tradition and simply 
declared the fetus a constitutional person because it regarded it as a person in the 
philosophical sense?  
 
Dworkin responds to this by restating that the idea of fetal personhood ‘is 
scarcely intelligible and few people believe it’.42 Yet this is only a reconfiguration of 
the ‘anti-personhood’ argument. Dworkin may think the idea that fetuses are 
persons unintelligible, but certainly more than a few people believe it. For those who 
do, the Roe majority’s refusal to extend equal constitutional status to the fetus was 
surely its greatest error. The upshot is that Dworkin fails to dislodge the primary 
significance of the derivative question for the constitutionality of abortion. Even if, 
as Dworkin claimed, little of the academic criticism surrounding Roe concerned the 
personhood ruling, he still seems to accept two key propositions: 
 
1. A finding of constitutional personhood on behalf of the fetus would affect 
the constitutionality of abortion, and 
                                                 
41 347 U.S. 483. 
42 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 112. 
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2. A correct belief in the philosophical personhood of the fetus is a reason for 
granting it constitutional personhood, even if this breaks with 
constitutional tradition. 
 
It follows from these joint propositions that whether or not the fetus is 
correctly regarded as a person in the philosophical sense in indeed integral for the 
constitutional argument about abortion. Consequently, Dworkin cannot use the 
‘anti-personhood’ argument to dismiss the constitutional primacy of the derivative 
question, especially to those who do, in fact, defend the philosophical personhood of 
the fetus. 
V. INTRACTABILITY AND PRINCIPLED COMPROMISE  
As was seen, Dworkin believed that if the derivative view of abortion conflict is 
correct, then that conflict is inherently intractable and resistant to principled 
compromise. Misunderstanding the real root of the disagreement therefore has 
serious consequences for resolving abortion politically. As he adumbrated: 
the confusion between the two kinds of objection [derivative and detached] 
has poisoned public controversy about abortion and made it more 
confrontational and less open to argument and accommodation than it should 
be.43 
Dworkin’s pessimistic characterization of the derivative debate stemmed from 
his claim that what is believed about the metaphysical status of the fetus can only 
                                                 
43 Ibid at 13. 
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ever be a matter of ‘primitive conviction’. The personhood question is a philosophical 
dead-end in the abortion debate partly because it cannot sponsor any reasoned 
exchanges. He makes the point that it is not even clear in theory what it would take 
for all participants in that debate to be persuaded one way or the other. As he puts it, 
‘there is no biological fact waiting to be discovered or crushing moral analogy 
waiting to be invented that can dispose of the matter’.44 It is not just that there have 
been no winning shots in the personhood debate; we cannot even be sure of what one 
would look like.45 
Insofar as philosophical tractability is thought to be a virtue of any account of 
the abortion problem, we should of course ask whether the detached view fares any 
better in that regard. If, as Dworkin argued, the basis of disagreement has in fact 
been the sanctity of human life all along, the very fact that the disagreement shows 
no signs of abating might be offered up as evidence in itself that the detached dispute 
is no more tractable than the derivative one. This should not be such a surprise. If 
Dworkin is correct that the nature of abortion dispute is ‘essentially religious’, 
                                                 
44 ibid at 10. 
 
45 This point can be reinforced merely by considering the multitude of hypothetical revelations about 
the fetus which would not obviously end argument about whether it meets the conditions for 
personhood. We might suppose it is discovered that the human fetus of a certain gestational age 
remembers things, feels pain, and has rudimentary desires. There will still be those who claim that 
independent biological existence is a necessary condition for personhood. Likewise, we could image 
scientists assuring us that a fetus possesses no conscious life whatsoever, no matter how rudimentary, 
before birth. For many, this will make no difference to the fetus’s personhood status, which owes to 
its membership in the human species, not any exercisable psychological capacity. There is, I think, no 
plain fact about the fetus which would end argument about prenatal personhood one way or the other. 
This is, of course, entirely what we should expect of a dispute which is fundamentally moral (having 
to do with the value that ought to be ascribed to creatures possessing this or that quality) and not 
scientific. 
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intractability is precisely what one would expect. It is strange if Dworkin imagined 
that a conflict rooted in religious-like commitments would foster more reasoned 
exchanges, or be any more philosophically soluble, than argument about the 
conditions for personhood.46 At the same time, if intractability really were a feature 
only of the derivative question, then the continuation of profound disagreement 
would count as good evidence for the derivative account. 
 It is not at all clear, then, that of the two kinds of disagreement, the 
derivative one is uniquely philosophically intractable. One might also think there is 
some measure of tension between Dworkin’s claims that the derivative question is 
not amenable to reasoned argument and his own reasoned argument against fetal 
personhood, based on their lack of mental states and, hence, interests. Let us put 
these complaints to one side, however, and consider Dworkin’s main argument about 
the political resolution of the abortion dispute. This is that if he is correct that 
abortion disagreement is ‘essentially religious’ disagreement, as the detached 
account suggests, a settled constitutional basis for compromise is provided by the 
doctrine of religious freedom. In practical terms, he argued, this means that a 
permissive stance on abortion practice is constitutionally required. The First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion protects the equal right of all citizens 
to follow their convictions on ‘profoundly spiritual matters’, with the result that 
states may not impose an official line on the abortion question.47 This constitutional 
                                                 
46 Perhaps all moral questions are intractable past a point – the point at which their answer depends 
on far more deep-seated philosophical commitments, argument about which is bound to be 
interminable.   
 
47 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 165.  
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basis for the abortion right is, he argued, one which all those committed to the free 
exercise of religion have a reason to accept, even if they continue to disagree, 
‘religiously’, about the morality of abortion. 
 Some will no doubt quibble with Dworkin’s suggestion that abortion beliefs 
can be assimilated into essentially religious ones.48 But let us assume that he is right 
about that. The next question is whether it follows, as Dworkin seems to believe, 
that the derivative issue is not pertinent to the constitutionality of abortion. 
Dworkin is guilty of a fundamental oversight regarding the limits of the doctrine of 
religious toleration if he believes that it can ground the abortion right irrespective of 
one’s answer to the derivative question. His mistake is in supposing that as soon as 
religious beliefs are at issue, the derivative worry about causing harm to persons 
ceases to be relevant for the legal resolution of disputes. The plain falsity of this is 
apparent when bringing to mind any exercise of religious belief that entails bodily 
harm to individuals we are certain are persons. Liberal democracies do not, for 
example, extend tolerance to practices of ritual child sacrifice, slavery, or female 
genital mutilation if and when those who practice them do so as a matter of religious 
conviction. The doctrine of religious toleration has clear limits: toleration ends 
where the infringement of people’s rights begins. And the infringement of the right 
to life is the clearest red line of all. 
 
                                                 
48 The definition of religious belief to which Dworkin appeals seems, rightly, to look to the content of 
the belief rather than the fervency with which it is held, although the content requirement itself is a 
fairly loose one, capturing everything that, he says, ‘touches on’ the ‘ultimate purpose and value of 
human life itself’. One might think that abortion beliefs are often religious in a different way, which is 
that they are mandated by the religious institutions to which many people are affiliated (as is surely 
true of American evangelicals, Catholics, Irish protestants, and so on). 
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 Dworkin is wrong, therefore, if he believes that applying the doctrine of 
religious toleration to abortion does not rest on derivative grounds, or presuppose 
them. If the fetus were a person, as one side of the abortion debate insists, the right 
to abortion could not be defended using the religious freedoms of those that take the 
opposite view, for the doctrine of religious toleration does not protect homicide. 
Indeed, if the religious nature of abortion beliefs mandates toleration of their 
expression even where that entails harm to persons, we would have to ask why 
Dworkin’s principle does not protect the killers of abortion doctors. Consequently, 
by even appealing to the doctrine of religious toleration as a basis for political 
resolution, Dworkin presupposes a particular answer to the philosophical question of 
prenatal personhood. Toleration of abortion choice, even as a mode of religious 
expression, cannot be justified if the fetus is a person. And this consideration propels 
the derivative question right back to the forefront of our reasoning about abortion. 
 
VI. ARGUING ABOUT PERSONHOOD 
 
But what if the notion of fetal personhood really does strike one, as it did Dworkin, 
as ‘scarcely intelligible’? In the eyes of some, the assignation of personhood to 
fetuses is wrong not merely in that it is a miscalculation—because it is, in the end, 
false. It is wrong for being conceptually incoherent. On this thinking, our shared 
concept of a person can no more admit human fetuses within its boundaries than it 
can admit rocks or trees or insects. To be sure, someone might protest that a rock, a 
tree or an insect is in fact a person, and that we have always been mistaken in 
thinking otherwise. To such a protest, there may be little to say except that the 
person making it does not grasp the concept of a person if she is willing to make 
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such claims. If anything is true about persons, it is that a rock cannot be one. A 
dispute about whether or not rocks in fact are persons could not, therefore, be an 
argument about the borderlines of the concept, but only an instance of discussants 
failing to discuss the same concept at all. 
 
 Dworkin seemed to view the fetal personhood debate in somewhat similar 
terms. As Don Marquis commented, ‘for Dworkin, apparently, the central claim 
needed to support the conclusions of those opposed to abortion hardly rises to the 
dignity of being false’.49 In Dworkin’s view, anyone who does not understand that 
conscious states are necessary features of a person simply lacks any comprehension 
of what persons most basically are. It is also possible to see from this just how 
Dworkin’s ‘anti-personhood’ argument undergirds his descriptive claims concerning 
what abortion argument is really all about. If the notion of fetal personhood is not 
even comprehensible, then it is hardly likely that abortion opponents believe it. Far 
more likely that abortion discussants are just employing different concepts and 
talking past each other. 
 
 If Dworkin was right about the conceptual absurdity of fetal personhood, 
then the derivative issue would seem to lose much of its argumentative relevance for 
abortion. It would be pre-eminent only in the sense that something nobody believes, 
and which is ‘scarcely intelligible’, would have serious implications for the legal and 
moral status of abortion if it happened to be true. This is surely irrelevance of an 
important kind. Likewise, if insects happened to be persons, this would have 
                                                 
49 Marquis (1996) at 129. 
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profound implications for the permissibility of pesticide use. Yet this does not entail 
that the permissibility of pesticide use hinges, fundamentally, on the question of 
‘insect personhood’ (as opposed to the possible ecological harms of its use), for we 
know that proposition to be plainly false. 
 
I have not wanted to commit myself here to any substantive view about fetal 
personhood, taking as my target instead the prior question whether the personhood 
issue is critical for our moral and legal calculations about abortion. One thing 
Dworkin’s enterprise may have revealed is just how difficult it is to form a judgment 
on this prior question that is hygienically separate from one’s beliefs about the 
conditions of personhood. If fetal personhood is an unintelligible proposition, the 
personhood question will hardly seem to have a place in explaining the moral 
complexity of abortion, if indeed any complexity then remains. 
 
 But I believe Dworkin overstated the case if he relegated the notion of fetal 
personhood to the realm of the conceptually incoherent. The human fetus is 
distinctly unlike rocks, trees and insects in ways that render ascriptions of 
personhood more intelligible with respect to them. Without wishing to expand 
much on those features here, three in particular stand out. The first is the human 
fetus’s biological membership in a species whose typical adult members are 
unquestionably persons. The second is its biological continuity with developed (and 
hence, paradigmatically person-like) human beings. The third is the historical errors 
of denying personhood status to some groups of biologically human beings. In every 
other case in history when some biological human beings have been denied status, or 
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full status, as persons, the denial has been a terrible moral atrocity. If we are right to 
take this attitude with fetuses, it will be the first and only time. 
 
These might all be fielded as tentative reasons for taking the suggestion of 
fetal personhood more seriously than the notion that rocks or trees or insects might 
be persons. Moreover, this shadow of a doubt clearly looms larger at the margins of 
gestation and birth, where the physiological differences between the fetus and 
personhood-possessing neonates are much reduced.50 And insofar as there is reason 
to take seriously the proposition that fetuses could be persons, the hypothetical 
implications of an affirmative answer make it the first port of call in a serious 
discussion about abortion.  
 
What, though, if the signal inconsistencies Dworkin illuminated hold 
independent rational appeal for us? What is someone to make of the derivative 
question if she finds merit in the notion that having an abortion is not just like 
cutting one’s hair or having a tonsillectomy, whilst being, nonetheless, a far cry from 
murder? For Dworkin, as we have seen, these cross-cutting judgements could only 
go to show that arguing about abortion by way of debating prenatal personhood is a 
fruitless. But perhaps he was too hasty in ruling out the possibility that a richer 
conception of personhood will somehow account for intuitions such as these. Where 
                                                 
50 I do not mean to assume here that neonates possess philosophical personhood whereas late-term 
fetuses do not, or that birth is morally significant for personhood status – questions about which 
there has been a good deal of writing. My point is only that the typical assignation of personhood to 
neonates gives reason to seriously examine the moral status of late fetuses, which closely resemble 
neonates in physiological development (although there are also marked physiological differences) and 
are closely biologically continuous with them. 
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Dworkin saw inconsistency, he might instead have seen ambivalence or nuance. He 
might have seen discussants grasping at an intermediate category of being – a being 
that lacks the full status of a person, but is not entirely without some of its interests 
and value. 
 
 Interestingly, by underscoring putative inconsistencies in hostile and 
favourable attitudes to abortion, Dworkin appears to have demonstrated at least one 
way to reason fruitfully about fetal personhood. In pointing out the surface 
inconsistencies in each other’s positions, contestants in the debate can appeal to one 
another through more than just ‘primitive conviction’. There is clear argumentative 
merit in pointing out, for instance, that someone’s failure to treat abortion as in all 
respects like murder, or as equal to infanticide, challenges her commitment to the 
belief that a fetus is a person in the fullest sense. Equally, asking someone who flatly 
denies fetal personhood what salient differences hold between late term fetuses and 
neonates can surely form part of a potentially persuasive argument. Whether they 
are ultimately winning or not, these are reasoned forms of engagement that seek to 
change minds by drawing on discussants’ own judgements and distinctions, and 
attempting to reveal inconsistencies within them (the standard methodology of 
moral philosophy).  
 
Still, if fetal personhood really is the touchstone of abortion disagreement, 
the question might linger as to why contestants in the abortion debate do not 
explicitly engage one another even more on that front than they already do. As I 
suggested earlier, discussants’ motivations for framing their position as they do may 
be multifarious, but one compelling explanation for the lack of a developed public 
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dialogue about the personhood question is that defenders of abortion rights in 
particular often fail to make their denial of fetal personhood explicit, or fully 
appreciate its importance in the wider debate. Failure to foreground this important 
premise might be due to more than one thing: a belief that the fetus’s sub-person 
status is so self-evident as to not warrant pointing out, or the inability to see any 
way of arguing for it that does not rely on its self-evidentiary quality. Either way, 
the result is a failure to meet the core tenet of abortion opposition head-on. Mary 
Anne Warren stated the problem this way: 
 
Because pro-abortionists have never adequately come to grips with the 
conceptual issues surrounding abortion, most if not all if the arguments they 
advance in opposition to laws restricting access to abortion fail to refute or 
even weaken the traditional antiabortion argument, i.e. that a fetus is a human 
being [in the “moral sense”], and therefore abortion is murder.51 
 
 Nor did Warren think that supporters of abortion rights should settle for a 
legal answer which views the terminating act as, albeit justified, ‘comparable to 
killing in self defence’, when the basis of their own conviction is, quite differently, 
‘the realisation that a fetus is not a person and thus does not have a full-fledged right 
to life’. 52  This frequent neglect of what is really a foundational premise in the 
abortion rights argument can go a long way towards explaining why it may seem as 
if the two sides must be disagreeing about something else.  
 
                                                 
51 Mary Ann Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 THE MONIST 43-61 (1973), at 43. 
52 Ibid at 52. 
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 On Dworkin’s view, the ‘quasi-religious’ nature of our beliefs in matters of 
life and death places the abortion issue firmly in the realm of private morality, and 
out of reach of the law’s coercive power, albeit not necessarily its non-coercive 
influence. In no context, however, is the fundamental right to life of born human 
beings subordinated to religious beliefs in this same way. Homicide crimes are never 
constructed so as to tolerate someone’s acting on such a belief. ‘Honour killings’, for 
instance, cannot be shielded by a principle of religious toleration, though they are, in 
one way, the expression of a view about life’s intrinsic value and what does and does 
not insult it. If the situation is different for human fetuses, this can only be because 
they are earmarked from the outset as differently morally positioned. If a fetus is 
metaphysically on a par with born humans, then something very different from 
tolerance towards diverse interpretations of the sanctity of life will be required to 
explain the moral permissibility of abortion. 
 
 It may be asked whether, in the end, what Dworkin called the ‘detached’ 
inquiry captures questions that are truly morally distinct from the derivative one. 
On one rendering, the question at the centre of the detached dispute is simply when, 
in the lifespan of a biologically human organism, that organism comes to possess the 
attributes which grant it strong moral protection, most pointedly protection against 
being killed in the cause of salvaging creative investment in the lives of others. Is 
this just the personhood question in another guise? However the substantive 
conditions for personhood are filled out, the detached view still hypothesises a point 
in the development of human life when terminating that life for anything other than 
the limited justifications we would accept for the killing of fully developed adult 
 48 
human beings is an impermissible affront to the sanctity of human life, the pertinent 
question then being just what it is that ushers in this new metaphysical status. 
 
To the extent that the detached and derivative questions are really two sides 
of the same coin, Dworkin’s reflections on the relative importance of natural and 
creative investment in human life introduced a new and valuable point of discussion: 
is biological humanity or human creative effort in a life more constitutive of moral 
status? In different ways, moral philosophers have subsequently taken up this 
discussion with zeal.53 Far from consigning the personhood inquiry to irrelevancy, 
however, these further questions only present particular, and potentially 
illuminating, ways of thinking about what constitutes a person. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 See, in particular, Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 183-202, 
(1989) and Jeff McMahan, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE, 
(2003).  
